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PROCEDURES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: TYPE OF
COMMISSION, DUE PROCESS & RIGHT TO COUNSEL
FLORENCE

R. PESKOE*

Recent events have focused public attention on the conduct of public
officials. I No branch of government is immune but the judiciary, which has
been given the last word in our three branched system, is most vulnerable to
criticism where it has failed to scrutinize the conduct of its members, to
compel conformity to appropriate standards, and to impose discipline for the
protection of the public.
The public has an indisputable interest in those who preside in its
courtrooms. It also has suspicions about courts and judges which will not be
allayed by judicial reluctance to submit to visible disciplinary proceedings.
In this era of "sunshine" laws, 2 consumerism3 and government by public
opinion poll, there is also the threat that legislative and executive branches
will move into the vacuum where no court initiated judicial disciplinary
system exists.
The discipline of judges is not a new idea. 4 Provision for extreme
measures such as impeachment, recall or other techniques for removal is
common in state constitutions. 5 Judicial discipline systems, however, providing for lesser sanctions and designating tribunals other than the legislature or the public are just now evolving.6 The first state judicial disciplinary
7
system, California's, dates only from 1960.
* Deputy Director, Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey; J.D., Rutgers
School of Law (Newark).
1. The most notable event which has contributed to this trend was the resignation of
President Richard M. Nixon on August 9, 1974.
2 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-14-1-1-5-14-1-6 (Bums 1974).
3. H.R. 6805, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
4. Only three states have yet to create judicial disciplinary systems: Maine, Mississippi
and Washington.
5. See Todd & Proctor, Burden of Proof,Sanctions& Confidentiality, 54 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 177, 183 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Todd & Proctor].
6. See Gillis, Michigan's Unitary System of Judicial Discipline: A Comparison with
Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 132-35 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Gillis].
7. See Gillis, supra note 6, at 117. Judicial disciplinary systems are no doubt viewed by
many as experimental and certainly, by few, as traditional. Attorney discipline systems, on the
other hand, have been operating throughout the United States for many years. Although
aspects of these systems are currently subject to challenge, judges are familiar with the
basically self-discipline pattern and would probably be more hospitable to a judicial selfdiscipline system than to any other. This is likely for several reasons: (1) the identification with
lawyers' professional antecedents such as special preparation, motivation to serve the public,
the emphasis on self-imposed standards since recipients of the service cannot judge what is or
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Most state judiciaries have already taken the initiative in developing
judicial disciplinary systems. It is important that these systems achieve
maximum effectiveness. It is also important in the interest of maintaining
judge morale and public credibility, that there be minimal disparity among
the systems.
Therefore, a model code can be useful both to assist the states in
evaluating deficiencies in existing judicial disciplinary systems and to assist
the courts in states just now establishing such systems. A model code further
can present the states with workable procedures which balance the interests
of: (1) the public-in the quality and style of its justice system; (2) the
courts-in dignified coherent and professional operation; and (3) each
judicial officer-whose conduct is to be scrutinized lest his reputation and
effectiveness be destroyed by the very process by which that conduct may be
vindicated.
The judiciary has responded to the need to establish standards, canons
and rules governing the implementation of judicial conduct, canons and
rules. A committee of judges and attorneys, drawn jointly from the Appellate Judges' Conference and the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline of the American Bar Association, has drafted proposed Standards
Relating to JudicialDisciplineand Disability.8This proposed model code is
intended to assist states wishing to improve existing judicial disciplinary
systems or to establish new systems.
This article will deal with the procedures in the Proposed Standards.
Specifically, major focus will be on those sections of the Proposed Stan2
1
0
dards relating to the receipt, 9 screening,' evaluation,' investigation,'
probable cause determination, 13 adjudication 14 and disposition' 5 of judicial
disciplinary complaints. The procedural steps will be considered in sequence and their due process implications and other relevant factors will be
discussed. A review of the decisions bearing upon due process requirements
for such proceedings will indicate where there is currently consensus and
where alternate approaches are needed. The cases relied upon will include
should be done, and the mutual recognition of a shared status; (2) due process requirements
which have been substantially identified and established; and (3) distrust of the ability of
outsiders to maintain the confidentiality of proceedings deemed desirable.
8. ABA PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY RETIREMENT Nos. 1. 1-9.4 (1977) [hereinafter cited in the footnotes as PROPOSED STANDARDS No. and
referred to in the text as the Proposed Standards].
9. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying No. 4. 1.
10. Id. at Nos. 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6.

11.

Id. at No. 4.4.

12.
13.
14.

Id. at Nos. 4.4 and 4.16.
Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.24.
Id. at Nos. 5.1-5.28.

15. Id. at Nos. 4.22 and 6.1-6.8.
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those involving judicial discipline proceedings and, where appropriate,
those involving attorney discipline and others from which analogies may be
drawn.
THE PROPOSED STANDARDS: ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL,
FLEXIBILITY & ADOPTION

The clear majority view is that the disciplinary proceedings can appropriately be conducted by a single body, analogous to that in an administrative agency, which combines the investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers. 1 6 The drafters of the Proposed Standards followed the majority
view and utilized the single body model as the basis for its proposed
system.17 The single body model is familiar. Its operation is relatively
simple; its support costs minimal. 18 The danger of premature publicity is
minimized where relevant files and information are kept in a central repository and there is no need for the transmission of such files among multiple
19
disciplinary bodies prior to the commencement of public proceedings.
Further, as the number of entities involved increases, the time needed to
2°
resolve the matter lengthens.
The emphasis throughout this article will be on the flexibility with
which the Proposed Standards can operate. Although the drafters have
endorsed a commission structure closely resembling the administrative
agency, or single body model, many of the recommendations can be adapted
to a multiple unit system. Indeed, differentiation of procedures for both
single and multiple unit systems may be quite appropriate for many other
reasons. Variations among states with respect to size and density of population, geography and the volume of complaints regarding judicial conduct are
among the most significant factors to be considered in connection with the
16. Regardless of whether the disciplinary functions are performed by one entity or
several, the same due process protections apply. See text accompanying notes 24-55 infra.
Thus, considerations other than due process result in the recommendation that one body handle
the discipline. In New Jersey, for example, where a statutory three judge court conducts the
hearing and makes finding and recommendations to the state's supreme court, which finally
determines the matter, it must first be constituted to that purpose in each case by the court.
Appointment occurs upon the issuance of an order to show cause and the filing of a complaint
after court review of a report from an advisory body, created by court rule to investigate
allegations of misconduct and make probable cause findings where appropriate. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: I B-2A:7 (West 1970). Cases known to this writer have averaged eleven months from
beginning to end. Even if the judge's term does not expire before the case is concluded,
mooting the whole thing, such a drawn out procedure cannot contribute to the public confidence in the system.
17. For an explanation of how the multibody, judicial disciplinary approach works, see
Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" JudicialDisciplinarySystem: Five Years and Counting, 54
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 69 (1977).
18. See Gillis, supra note 6, at 128-35.
19. See generally Todd & Proctor, supra note 5, at 189-99.
20. See note 16 supra.
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manner in which the disciplinary system should operate. Other valid bases
for differentiation include the size of the disciplinary budget, the size and
professionalism of the staff, the degree of publicity in specific cases, and
whether the state's highest court administers both attorney and judicial
discipline.
An assumption has been made that state court systems will be organized with the highest appellate court and its presiding member at the apex.
Further, it has been assumed that administrative responsibility for the
system will be reposed in that court.2 1 Mere symmetry would probably
suggest that disciplinary authority over the judiciary should also be the high
court's responsibility 22 but there are more important reasons.
An administrative authority could not long remain effective if it could
not to some extent discipline its members. The power to assign calendars, to
designate presiding members of multi-judge courts, to move judges from
one location to another, and to require the filing of reports is complemented
and strengthened by the responsibility for the imposition of discipline. Thus,
the recommended standards for the enforcement of judicial discipline are
23
corollary to those on court organization.
Wherever the Proposed Standards depart from disciplinary procedures
which have become customary in a majority of jurisdictions, the departure
will be noted and explained. The drafters, as a matter of policy, preferred
the familiar to the novel wherever the alternatives were deemed equally
effective.
No special mention will be made of transitional steps that may be
required as a state adopts the Proposed Standards. Since the changes may be
drastic in some jurisdictions and slight in others, general treatment of the
area is impossible. It is likely, however, that the adoption of new rules with
respect to judicial discipline will follow the usual practice required in each
jurisdiction as to the adoption of court rules. Upon adoption, it is recommended that ample advance announcement and explanation be provided.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The due process requirements applicable to judicial discipline as in any
adjudicatory system derive from a determination of the particular procedural
rights and depend upon the nature of the proceeding and the interests of both
the government and the individual.' The balancing of public and private
21. Of course, where the judge to be disciplined is a member of the state's highest court,
special problems arise. Provision for an alternate court to decide such matters is discussed
below. See text accompanying note 211 infra.
22. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 1.1.
23.

ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (1974).

24. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1969) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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interests and the relative importance to be accorded each determines the
degree to which the adjudicatory proceeding in question must protect the
accused. For example, when an accused is confronted with a criminal
prosecution where he may face deprivation of liberty by incarceration, he is
guaranteed "the full panoply of due process protections.' '25 In administrative proceedings, where a statute declares the applicable due process rights
and sets forth the procedure to enforce them, as in a proceeding challenging
the termination of employment of a non-probationary federal employee, the
proceeding is not judicial and the possible loss of one's job is not an interest
such as would be deemed analogous to the loss of liberty. 26 Thus, the
employee in the administrative proceeding is not entitled to the same degree
of due process protection as the accused in a criminal proceeding. Judicial
discipline proceedings, however, are conceived of as judicial proceedings
and, therefore, even where statutory provisions with respect thereto exist,
they are not necessarily controlling.27
Disciplinary proceedings have been variously characterized as administrative, civil, and quasi-penal in nature. 28 California views attorney disciplinary proceedings as sui generis, neither civil nor criminal nor administrative, and holds accordingly that "ordinary [criminal] procedural safeguards
do not apply.' '29 Once it is established that the balance, in disciplinary
proceedings, must favor the need "to protect the courts and the public from
the official ministrations of the persons unfit to practice" 30 rather than the
rights of the individual, it is clear that due process need not approach the
criminal standard.
The principal thrust of cases attacking commission proceedings on due
process grounds focuses on the fact that disciplinary bodies are empowered
to perform both the functions of investigation and adjudication. The leading
United States Supreme Court case on this aspect of professional disciplinary
proceedings is Withrow v. Larkin,31 involving charges against a licensed
physician. In Withrow, the Supreme Court held that having a single board
investigate and adjudicate the disciplinary case was not violative of due
25. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(citations omitted).
26. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974).
27. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 222,291 N.E.2d 477,483 (1972).
28. See Yokozeki v. State Bar, II Cal. 3d 436, 440, 521 P.2d 858, 861, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602,
605, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) (administrative); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1,15, 241 So. 2d
469, 471 (1970) (civil); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 425
U.S. 901 (1976) (quasi-criminal).
29. Yokozeki v. State Bar, IICal. 3d 436, 447, 521 P.2d 858, 865, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602,609,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
30. In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
31. 421 U.S 35 (1974).
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process without a showing of actual bias or so strong a likelihood of bias on
32
the part of the decisionmaker as to be constitutionally intolerable.
In the majority opinion, Justice White reviewed the various kinds of
proceedings in which it had been deemed constitutional for both functions to
be performed by a single responsible person or body and considered the
courts which may try the same case more than once and various administrative agencies in which hearing examiners may hold multiple hearings in a
matter either upon reversal and remand or for other reasons. 33 He pointed
out that most agencies function under section 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 34 which exempts "the agency or a member or members of
the body comprising the agency" from the prohibition against an employee's participation or advice in the adjudication of a matter which he has
35
investigated or prosecuted.
Justice White distinguished In re Murchison36 where the judge had
impermissibly presided over the trial of a matter as to which he had heard
secret testimony by witnesses under compulsion and would be likely to rely
on "his own personal knowledge and impression of what had happened in
the grand jury room. " 37 In Withrow, the commission's investigative proceeding, which involved criminal acts charged under an abortion statute,
was not public but both the respondent and his counsel were permitted to
attend and counsel actually did so. In the Court's unanimous view, this was
comparable to a judge presiding, prior to the trial, at various pretrial
hearings, as in Murchison, including those requiring a preliminary finding
3
of probable cause and not contrary to due process. 1
Essentially, the court concluded that the performance in disciplinary
proceedings of dual functions by one body was constitutional as long as the
proceeding remained sufficiently adversarial. The Court said that "[t]he
initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes
them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a
procedural due process violation." 3 9 Where, unlike this case, "the initial
view of the facts, based on the evidence derived from non-adversarial
processes as a practical or legal matter, foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a
substantial due process question would be raised.'"40
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 47.
See id. at 47-51.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (Supp. IV 1974).
421 U.S. at 52.
349 U.S. 133 (1955).
Id. at 138.
421 U.S. at 56.

39. Id. at 58.
40. Id. Other courts dealing with attacks on the proceeding on the grounds that multiple
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In short, the investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are
all performed by existing judicial disciplinary commissions and will be so
performed pursuant to the Proposed Standards. 4 The United States Supreme
Court has approved the use of a single commission in this manner. Conformity to the degree of due process required in other professional disciplinary
proceedings is possible within the judicial disciplinary context.4 2 Because
the nature of disciplinary proceedings is not analogous to that of criminal
proceedings, procedural safeguards accorded criminal defendants are often
not required in the former. 43 The conceptual difference has been acknowledged and described as "not a full-blown trial but an inquest-a gathering
of facts concerning the conduct of an attorney, a subject more likely to be
illuminated by the evidence of the attorney's own acts than by what is said
or not said by someone else."44
Generally, professional disciplinary proceedings have been attacked on
equal protection grounds because respondents in disciplinary matters are
treated differently from other litigants. In Mildner v. Gulotta,'4 the petitioner-attorney challenged the New York attorney disciplinary system on the
ground that since the appellate courts within the state court system performed an integral role in the disciplinary process, attorneys were denied the
protection accorded other professionals in that they were denied appellate
review.4 The majority held that states may "legitimately find reason to
conclude that differing procedural safeguards are appropriate for different
professions." 47 The Court relied on the United States Supreme Court's view
that there is no violation of equal protection if the denial of appellate right is
reasonable and rests "upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."41
The New York system held reasonable by the Mildner court involved
functions were entrusted to one body have quibbled about which functions were actually
performed. See In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976) involving a judge who broke into a
neighbor's house, searched it and removed items which might be used as weapons. The
disciplinary proceeding there was viewed by the Supreme Court of Missouri as combining,
acceptably, an investigatory (not prosecutorial) and judicial function. See also McCartney v.
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
41. See Gillis, supra note 6, at 128-35 for an analysis of how existing systems have
incorporated these functions into their systems. See also PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8,
at No. 1.1.
42. See text accompanying notes 122-152 infra.
43. See id.
44. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 182.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (quoted in Mildner v.
Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 193 (E D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)).
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the use of the same judicial body to license attorneys and to discipline
them.4 9 In particular, despite a vehement dissent,50 the Court found that the
legislature was not arbitrary or capricious when it established the attorney
disciplinary system and determined that final disposition under the system
would be conclusive." Appellate review could be had only upon a challenge
on the basis of constitutional irregularities or where the appellate court
52
granted a discretionary appeal.
The challenge to the New York attorney discipline system in Mildner
also focused on the fact that the disciplining court could and did hold,
contrary to the report of its factfinder, that the misconduct alleged had been
proved and that discipline was warranted.5 3 The court, in so doing, did not
hear witnesses or oral argument or give reasons for its rejection of the report
submitted to it. The dissent thought that where a significant individual right
such as a professional license was at stake, minimum due process required
the opportunity to confront witnesses.-' He stressed the stigma attaching to
the proceedings and declared that, on balance, the due process to be
accorded attorney respondents should amount to that given criminal defendants. This was the minority view in the Mildner court and remains so among
55
those who have spoken with regard to judicial disciplinary proceedings.
Judicial disciplinary proceedings are not unconstitutional because they
do not treat those charged in the way that the criminal justice system treats
criminal defendants. Neither the same separation of functions, allocated to
the charging, adjudicatory and appellate entities, nor the same due process
requirements are necessary. The Supreme Court has declared that so long as
procedural rights appropriate to the proceedings are afforded the disciplinary
respondent, the system's structure can utilize a single commission. In the
discussion which follows, those rights will be considered in relation to the
procedures recommended in the Proposed Standards.
PROPOSED PROCEDURES PRIOR TO FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE

PreliminaryInquiry
The proposed procedures provide for the initiation, on any reasonable
basis, of a preliminary inquiry to establish whether there is sufficient
justification for a full investigation. 56 A preliminary inquiry is intended
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(1972).
55.
56.

405 F. Supp. at 193-94.
Id. at 201 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
Id.at 194.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 212 (Weinstein, J., dissenting); see also In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355-56
See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.1.
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primarily to enable accurate evaluation of all matters presented 57 and prompt
identification of those properly subject to disciplinary review. 58 This is not
the time to investigate in depth. If what is complained about amounts to a
disappointed litigant's desire to change the result of a case, appellate review
should be suggested.5 9
Present practice in many jurisdictions requires, by rule or by custom,
the filing of a sworn complaint. The Proposed Standards recommend that
there be no such requirement; 6° any person or group should have the opportunity to initiate a disciplinary inquiry. 6 1 Since the process is intended not to
punish but to ensure judicial fitness, allegations of unfitness should not be
disregarded if not under oath.
The inquiry might be triggered by a report in the news media or an
anonymous letter. 62 Witnesses or litigants usually do not hesitate to sign
their complaint letters but attorneys or court staff, who do not wish to risk a
judge's wrath if their information is not taken seriously, might be willing to
notify a disciplinary commission about the judge's misconduct if it can be
done anonymously. The fact that no one knows who reported that a judge
was drunk on the bench does not make him less drunk or more fit.
It is important that publicity be given to the location of the office to
which complaints should be directed and that responsible persons, whether
committee members or staff, should review the information transmitted with
expedition and in confidence. 63 All sources of information should be accorded respect including telephone calls. Reports of misconduct appearing in the
press can destroy a judge's reputation. Published items, true or not, are
likely to generate public clamor for action and reporters' inquiries about
what is being done. These cannot be disregarded because they are not
submitted under oath. The judge has a right to expect prompt review by the
commission's staff.
Adequate inquiry into allegations regarding a judge's treatment of
litigants, attorneys or witnesses, may require a visit or two to his court or a
reading of some transcripts before any reasonable evaluation can be made.
Other acceptable forms of preliminary inquiry may further include discreet
telephone calls, checking court dockets or interviewing complaining witnesses.
Until a screening decision is made following the preliminary inquiry,
57. Id.
58. Id. at No. 3.4.
59. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 3.4.
60. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at Commentary accompanying Nos. 2.8 and 4.4.
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the standards provide that the judge need receive no notification. 64 The
question of notice to the judge who is the subject of a preliminary inquiry
has been considered at length by the drafters. A minority thought the judge
should always be apprised of the inquiry, whether or not his comments were
sought. It was suggested that such notice might lessen the likelihood of
"secret police" tactics or of a disciplinary staff generating business for
itself. The majority has adopted the prevailing judicial view that notice is
not required until and unless there arises a need for the judge to respond to a
charge.65 Therefore, the standards provide that until an evaluation and
screening decision is made, following the preliminary inquiry, the judge
need receive no notification of the matter. Of course a staff decision that
there is suff:icient basis to proceed necessitates further consideration of the
question of notice to the judge. It should be emphasized generally that
interviewing of witnesses or the use of other investigatory methods likely to
attract attention is not contemplated at this stage.
Proponents of the requirement that sworn complaints must provide the
basis for judicial discipline inquiries may believe that this would thereby
protect judges from unwarranted attacks. They may also believe that, if
complaints had to be sworn to, inappropriate complaints would be less likely
to be filed or the commission's staff would be saved wasteful inquiry and
screening time. To some degree the latter statement is probably true, but
limiting commission inquiries to those matters initiated by complaints under
oath will do nothing to protect judges against unwarranted published criticism. Further, such limitation will do nothing to protect the court system
where only attorneys, who must appear before a judge, know about his
misconduct and, for a variety of reasons, will not wish to be identified as the
complainants. Also, there are situations in which no one person deems
himself injured by a judge's misconduct and no one would file a complaint
even though the public is being disserved. Such reluctance may also apply
where a physical or mental disability is present.
An additional consideration of the drafters in rejecting the necessity of
a sworn complaint is that mere uncertainty might deter some from coming
forward. Swearing to something is a serious matter. The commission should
never seem to be inviting complaints but it should be receptive to all who
can assist it. Those who think they have relevant information should be
allowed to submit it without excessive formality.
To insure the public's confidence in the disciplinary system, all communications regarding a judge's conduct should be reviewed. Preliminary
64. Id. at Nos. 4.5 and 4 10.
65. Id. at No. 4.5; see id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.5.
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inquiries to ascertain the nature of the complaint, not to determine whether
there is a substantial basis for it, should be made promptly and discreetly
and with complete assurance as to confidentiality to all concerned.6 6 On that
basis notice to the judge need not be mandatory. Withholding of early notice
is appropriate where there is a risk that an investigation might be impeded or
undue anxiety would be caused.
PreliminaryEvaluation
When the preliminary inquiry has been completed, an evaluation is to
be made of the nature of the allegations, their substantiality and the likelihood that, if supported factually, there might be a basis for disciplinary
action. 67 The evaluation should be by a senior staff member or, where the
commission has no professional assistance, by the chairman or a member to
whom the responsibility has been assigned. It is anticipated that the jurisdictions will develop guidelines by which the evaluating officer can judge
each matter. Where there appears insufficient cause to proceed upon any of
the bases suggested above, or others formulated by the commission, the
matter should be dismissed. 68 The file should be closed without investigation. Those who have been informed about the inquiry should be told that it
has been terminated without adjudication. 69
A determination that there is sufficient cause to proceed does not
constitute a finding of probable cause. Sufficient cause to proceed means
that the allegation against the judge is not (1) patently frivolous;70 (2)
merely an effort by a disappointed litigant to get a redetermination; 71 (3) the
result of ignorance about judicial proceedings; 72 or (4) a complaint which,
even if true, would not be the basis for a disciplinary proceeding. 73 A
finding of sufficient cause to proceed means that further investigation is
warranted. The results of the investigation will indicate whether a probable
cause review need be made.
Information gathered during a preliminary inquiry may be retained
even if the charge is dismissed.7 4 It may be useful subsequently as an aid in
66. See text accompanying notes 103-116 infra for a further discussion of confidentiality
in relation to the various stages of the proceedings which follow.
67. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.4.
68. Id. at No. 4.14.

69. Id.
70. Id. at No. 4.3.
71. Id.at No. 3.4.
72. Id. at No. 4.3.

73. Id.
74. Id. at No. 4.15. See also In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied sub nom.
Kelly v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 401 U.S. 962, rehearingdenied, 403 U.S. 940
(1970) (accumulation of evidence of past acts may be used to show a pattern of judicial

misconduct).
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investigating later allegations of misconduct by that judge. Review of such
records might serve to avoid*duplication of a previous inquiry upon receipt
of similar complaints.
Probable Cause: Pleadings
When an allegation of judicial misconduct is not dismissed following
preliminary evaluation and sufficient cause to proceed is found, a formal
investigation should take place without delay." The results of this investigation will lead to a presentation to the commission and a determination as to
76
the existence or lack of probable cause.
The investigation must be premised on a filed complaint.77 A sworn
complaint should be obtained from each complainant. 78 This complaint
should be differentiated from the formal statement of charges which will be
filed prior to a formal hearing in any case in which probable cause has been
found. 79 If it is not possible to obtain a sworn complaint, because the
witness is not available or adamantly refuses to cooperate, the commission's
staff may prepare a clear statement of the allegations. 8 The complaint or the
81
alternative statement should be served promptly on the judge.
In the complaint, each alleged act of misconduct should be set forth
clearly.82 The charges and the facts on which they are based should be
specified. Adequate notice to the judge should include an indication of the
constitutional, statutory or disciplinary code provisions deemed to have
been offended. s3
Not all courts regard codes of judicial or professional conduct as having
legal force. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated in In re Haggerty" that the
Canons of Judicial Ethics8 5 merely set a standard of conduct expected of the
judiciary without having the force of law.8 6 However, the drafters of the
75.
76.
judicial
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Nos. 4.16 and 4.17.
Neither a grand jury nor an analogous charging body is recommended in relation to
disciplinary proceedings. Id. at No. 4.24.
PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.16.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 122-152 infra.
PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.16.
Id. at No. 4.17.
Id. at No. 4.16; see id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.17.
Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.17.
257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
ABA CANNONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1969).

86. 257 La. at 17, 241 So. 2d at 474. In Haggerty, the judge was charged with many
indiscretions and the court was considering the question of the adequacy of the notice to him.
The court was quite sure that the judge in question knew exactly what he was doing and what
standard he was offending when it commented, regarding three women who were invited by
him to a stag party, that "conviction is not the only method by which it may be established that
one is, in fact, a prostitute. . . . It is unthinkable that, knowing the character of the party and
the nature of the films to be shown, respondent would have invited decent women to the
party." Id. at 31-35, 241 So. 2d at 480 (emphasis in original).
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Proposed Standards recommend the use of references to such code provision
in complaints or statements of charges. 87 Where such codes have been
enacted as statutory or court rules, they provide the basis for enforceable
conduct standards. Where they do not have such status, they may serve as
illustrations of the conduct prescribed by law.88
Adequacy of notice is measured at both the probable cause stage and,
subsequently, in relation to the formal hearing. The standards, however,
which apply are quite different. The question of notice of charges at the
preliminary investigation stage was discussed at length by the California
Supreme Court in McCartney v. Commission on JudicialQualifications89 in
which it was concluded that "notice to the judge under preliminary investigation as to the nature of the complaints against him is not compelled as a
matter of due process.' "90 This was deemed true even if the rules governing
the commission provided "reasonable opportunity in the course of the
preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may choose." 91 In
that case, the respondent judge had been made aware of certain welfare
fraud allegations against him but he had had no notice of other pending
charges until formally served in advance of the evidentiary hearings. The
court held that "[a]t [that] stage of the proceedings. . . , the Commission
clearly has not yet commenced to perform any adjudicatory function, but is
merely attempting to examine citizen complaints in a purely investigatory
manner. '92
A similar question before the Texas Supreme Court in In re Carrillo,9
where the preliminary notice did not set forth all the charges ultimately
considered, was resolved in much the same way as by the McCartney
court. 94 Only the notice of charges filed prior to formal hearings or adjudication was held to be significant with respect to due process and the fact that
respondent had replied earlier to a preliminary notice did not prevent
amendment and supplementation of the charges, so long as he had ample
opportunity to reply and did reply to the twelve charges finally filed against
him.

95

The notice to be provided the respondent judge by the complaint or
statement of allegations must be specific enough to allow preparation of a
response which will be meaningful. The decisions defining adequacy in this
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 17, 241 So. 2d at 474.
Id.
12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
Id. at 519, 526 P.2d at 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
Id.
Id.
542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1976).
Id. at 108.
Id.
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context make clear the desirability of completeness but also demonstrate
enough flexibility to permit supplementation and amendment.
Determination of Probable Cause
A finding of probable cause must be made by the commission before a
formal hearing takes place. 96 Since the Proposed Standards do not suggest
the test for a finding of probable cause, it may be inferred that the various
states are expected to apply their respective standards. It is submitted that
for a finding of probable cause, the threshold determinations are that: (1)
there is evidence of misconduct; (2) the judge in question engaged in the
misconduct; and (3) the misconduct warrants formal review.
The finding could be made without the participation of the respondent
judge,' but the Proposed Standards contemplate affording him a reasonable
opportunity to answer the charges. Provision is made for the judge to
respond in writing or, if he prefers, by a personal appearance before the
commission.98 The judge is entitled to counsel and both the judge and the
commission are empowered to compel the attendance and testimony of
99
witnesses and the production of books and records.
The Proposed Standards provide that the vote of a majority of the
commission members present suffices to establish probable cause.l1° If the
commission fails so to find, the disciplinary proceeding should be terminated and prompt notice given to the judge and the complainants. 10 1 Upon
02
a finding of probable cause, further proceedings are formal and public. 1
Confidentiality
The drafters have considered at length the problem of balancing the
public interest in knowledge of the disciplinary proceedings and the need to
protect a judge's reputation from premature, perhaps inaccurate, disclosure.
Confidentiality of the proceedings during the preliminary inquiry, the investigatory stage and prior to a determination of probable cause is commonly
recognized as appropriate protection for the judge. It has been deemed a
matter of right. 103 It is also perceived as secrecy, an opportunity for private
arrangements among those wishing to minimize public awareness of a
96. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.6 and Commentary accompanying No.
4.6.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at No. 4.21.
Id.
Id. at Nos. 4.18-4.20.
Id. at No. 4.24.
Id. at No. 4.22.
Id. at Nos. 5.1-5.28.
See In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 533-34, 243 N.W.2d 86, 94 (1974).
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judge's misconduct and avoid scandal. 104 The Proposed Standards recommend that the judge be accorded the right to confidential proceedings until
there is a determination of probable cause and that he be allowed to waive
105
that protection if he so desires.
In circumstances where both the judge and the public are aware of the
proceedings and the matter has not been dismissed upon evaluation following the preliminary inquiry, the judge may believe that his reputation and his
judicial effectiveness will suffer more from secrecy regarding the proceedings, even if there is ultimate vindication, than from public knowledge about
them. An election or opportunity for reappointment may be imminent. The
judge may have reason to believe that his willingness to acknowledge the
pendency of the proceedings and to permit disclosure of information about
them will assist him in the quest for another term. 106
Confidentiality regarding the proceedings benefits participants other
than the judge. Maintenance of the policy of confidentiality shields witnesses and citizen complainants whose identities are known and who may
desire not to be publicly identified until absolutely necessary, such as upon
initiation of a formal adjudication hearing. 107 Thus, the threat of a waiver of
confidentiality may affect a potential complainant's willingness to come
forward. A complainant whose identity is prematurely disclosed in connection with a complaint about one judge may refrain from submitting important information about another.
It is true that the opportunity to provide information anonymously may
relieve some informants of anxiety regarding public identification but upon
investigation they may well become known. The drafters of the Proposed
Standards have concluded that the reasons for accepting anonymous information as a basis for initiating an inquiry apply as well to the need to protect
the privacy of known complainants at least until a finding of probable cause
is made and a public hearing of the matter is to follow. 108 This position
accords with that expressed by the Michigan Supreme Court which stated in
09

In re Mikesell:1

If the respondent and others similarly situated were allowed to
discover the name of every complainant, including those who will
not appear and those whose complaints have been dismissed, the
free flow of information to the commission would be curtailed.
The commission carefully investigates all complaints and this
Court would not want to discourage citizen complainants from
voicing their ideas." 0
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.6.
Id. at Nos. 4.8 and 4.6.
Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 4.6.
Id.
396 Mich. 517, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1974).
Id. at 534, 243 N.W.2d at 93. Mikesell involved a judge who was accused of intemper-
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Upon a finding of probable cause and the commencement of the hearing
process, "it is no longer necessary to protect the identity of the complainant" 111 because: (1) there is no longer a danger that the charges would
be frivolous; and (2) the judge is entitled to know the identity of complainants and witnesses so as to pursue effective discovery in preparation of
112
his defense.
In considering the question of probable cause, the commission may ask
the judge to respond to questions or comment about the preliminary inquiry
or, thereafter, about the investigation. 113 A problem arises with respect to
the judge's participation at this stage, however, because he may decide to
rely at a formal hearing on his constitutional right under the fifth amendment
not to incriminate himself. 4 Once he has participated voluntarily, however
informally, during preliminary proceedings, he will be deemed to have
waived that right. This is true with respect to the subject matter about which
the judge commented even though the matter was handled confidentially. 1 5
The judge charged has been accorded, in the Proposed Standards,
confidentiality at all stages of the proceedings prior to a finding of probable
cause. He has also been provided the right to request public disclosure of the
proceedings at a stage earlier than the adjudicatory hearing. This recommendation is made even though, as indicated above, witnesses and complainants are benefited by confidentiality and are thereby protected from
intimidation.' 16
Right to Counsel
Once a judge has notice that charges have been made against him, he is
entitled to counsel of his own choice." 7 The problems that may be generated
ance. He was alleged to have repeatedly and continually criticized, abused and harassed
attorneys appearing before him and to have failed to remain impartial, frequently taking over
criminal matters and assuming a prosecutorial role. There were many complainants. See also
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1972).
111. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying No. 4.6.
112. Id.
113. See id. at No. 4.5.
114. See In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
115. In Haggerty, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that, although the respondent had
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a matter of minimum due process, he
had waived it. The court held that he did so not only by his testimony at the hearing, but also by
volunteering a statement during the investigation and by his appearance and voluntary testimony for a prehearing discovery deposition. 257 La. at 14, 241 So. 2d at 473. See also In re
Kunkle, 218 N.W.2d 521 (N.D. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1036 (1974).
For a discussion of the relationship between a judge's appearance before a grand jury and
subsequent proceedings see Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1037 (1972). In that case, the testimony preceded the remand in question. See also Kugler
v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975), where a special brand of coercion was claimed by a former
judge seeking federal intervention in a state prosecution.
116. See 396 Mich. at 534, 243 N.W.2d at 94.
117. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 4.18. Apparently the matter of counsel,
whether as to the entitlement, selection or consequences of such service, has required little
adjudication in the context of proceedings to discipline judges. No reported cases have been
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when an attorney representing a judge may also practice in the judge's court
must be considered in the light of the impact on the court system and
possible appearance of conflict or partiality. In addition, there are questions
of fee and the inferences that may be drawn if no fee is charged, the
desirability of using counsel with whom the judge may be unfamiliar but
whose appearances are not usually in the court where the judge sits, and the
permissibility of special admission of counsel who may be experienced in
the trial of judicial disciplinary proceedings.
It is reasonable to expect the respondent-judge in disciplinary proceedings to choose to be represented by an attorney he knows and in whom he
has confidence, both as to professional ability and as to personal integrity.
Such a choice is likely to involve an attorney who practices in the geographical area where the judge sits and may be one who makes appearances before
him. If the appearances are occasional, the conflicts of interest that may or
may appear to result will reasonably cause the judge to recuse himself from
cases involving his counsel. Opposing counsel and his clients should be
permitted to request such action if the relationship between the judge and the
attorney is known.
If the appearances are potentially frequent, or if it is a single judge
court or one with a small bench, such recusal could cause serious imbalances in the handling of the caseload. This is obviously undesirable from
the point of view of good judicial administration. If recusal is not used and a
party and his attorney are initially unaware of the judge's earlier retention of
opposing counsel, the disclosure at some future date of the prior relationship
will have serious implications for the reputation of the court system. There
is likely to be an inference of partiality on the part of the judge and the usual
consequences thereof with respect to challenges to the trial decision. If
recusal is not employed and the judge-counsel relationship is known initially, no one appearing in opposition will believe he is facing an impartial
judge. This is true even though such opposing counsel may forego moving
that the judge disqualify himself lest he incur the displeasure of that judge
before whom he must appear in the course of his practice.
It is unfair to put attorneys and clients in the position of having to
choose between moving for disqualification or submitting to a court which
they believe biased. It is for these reasons that the following suggestion has
found. Nor is there much decisional law regarding counsel with respect to attorney discipline.
In one attorney discipline case, however, the attorney-respondent was told by the court that
"(a) member of the bar has an obligation to obtain counsel if he wishes to be represented at a
hearing." Yokozeki v. State Bar of Cal., I I Cal. 3d 436, 447, 521 P.2d 858, 865, 113 Cal. Rptr.
602, 609, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). The attorney-respondent had an active South Seas
practice which presented special problems of communication (and also of discovery since
depositions were sought from persons in Tokyo) and the procedural rules were fashioned with

great concern for due process on the part of the commission. The respondent was apparently
somewhat less diligent about his role, including the retention of counsel. The court seemed to
equate the right to appear with the right to counsel.
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been made. Where such arrangements can be made, counsel should be
chosen from among attorneys whose practice is not in the same geographical
area as the court over which the judge presides. Where possible, bar
associations should exchange information about the availability of their
members to serve judges in commission proceedings occurring in neighboring districts. It may also be that, in the future, some attorneys will
develop experience in judicial discipline matters. Such practitioners could
be brought from another jurisdiction under a special admission rule for the
purpose.
An additional problem which arises in the occasional case involving
protracted proceedings is that of the cost of counsel. Where the factual basis
for the charges is complicated and involves the analysis of much data or
extended discovery or the presentation of many witnesses, the matter may
be prolonged. This is especially true where the commission itself hears the
evidence and its meetings cannot be scheduled continuously but must be
adjourned and resumed periodically. There may also be a delay if elaborate
physical or mental examinations are indicated and the reports thereof require
specialized interpretation.
The suggestion that counsel should be provided at public expense was
rejected by the drafters even where fees may mount up for special reasons
because of the anticipated adverse public reaction. Presently counsel is
provided at public expense in most jurisidictions only to indigents. l"8 Judges
are certainly not viewed by the public as indigents or anywhere near
indigent. Besides, judicial disciplinary proceedings cannot be equated with
criminal proceedings. It is only in criminal matters that the constitutional
right to counsel has been found to require the appointment and public
reimbursement of attorneys.
The Proposed Standards recommend that all costs associated with the
proceedings should be borne by the public, 119 except the judge's counsel
fee. 120 There is also provision for the assessment of costs as a sanction. 121
The drafters believed that except for an extraordinary situation, a
respondent judge should arrange for his own representation. There is a
likelihood in some circumstances that counsel fees will not be charged. That
may involve the incurring of some obligation on the part of the judge
represented, resulting in increased appearance of probable bias as discussed
above. As to the propriety of representation without fee, the drafters have
taken no position. Judges must be expected to evaluate fairly their ability to
deal impartially with attorneys in matters before them and, in doing so, to
weigh carefully acceptance of an attorney's services for any purpose.
118. See Gidion v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1969).
119. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.28.
120. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 5.28.
121. Id.; see id. at Nos. 5.25 and 6.8.
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ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURES AFTER FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Notice: ProceduralDue Process Considerations
These Proposed Standards provide that, once probable cause is found,
a series of procedures dealing with the initiation, conduct and resolution of a
formal adjudicatory process shall follow.' 2 2 These procedures include the
filing of formal charges; 123 service on the judge; 124 provision of an opportu126
conduct of the hearing; 127
nity to respond; 125 preparation and discovery;

and the disposition.128 There is provision for the amendment of the statement of charges, 129 for the preparation of transcripts 3 0 and for the utilization
of the report where the factfinder is not the whole commission. 1 3 The
proposed procedures are expected to be implemented by the state's adoption
of procedural rules appropriate to the jurisdiction. 132 Although the Proposed
Standards were intentionally drafted with less specificity than is expected to
characterize the procedural rules as ultimately adopted by the states, the
desirability of adopting rules to facilitate expeditious disposition of judicial
33
disciplinary cases is emphasized. 1
Adherence to procedural due process standards is required in judicial
disciplinary proceedings as it is required in any formal adjudicative process.
Respondents must be accorded fair, reasonable notice of the charges against
them and an opportunity to be heard. The timing and manner of notice is
significant. 13 Notice requirements must be measured in association with the
opportunity afforded the respondent to obtain discovery, to compel tes122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.at Nos. 5.1-5.28.
Id. at No. 5.1.
Id. at No. 5.2.
Id. at No. 5.3.
Id. at Nos. 5.4 and 5.6-5.8.
Id. at Nos. 5.9-5.15.
Id. at Nos. 5.20-5.24.
Id. at No. 5.16.
Id.at No. 5.18.

131.

Id. at No. 5.19.

132. For example, in a small state the commission may be able to meet in a central location.
In a large state, it might be necessary to ride circuit. Hearings before the whole commission
might be appropriate in states with small or moderate caseloads. Where the volume is great
three member panels or referees (masters) might be utilized to increase productivity. Referees
might be used where a hearing is expected to be of long duration or to involve especially
complex or technical matters.
133. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying No. 5.5. The
setting of deadlines must take note of staff capacity, degree of public scrutiny and other
relevant factors. As long as they are reasonable in each case, the time limits provided do not
need to be the same. See note 117 supra.
134. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970). In Goldberg, where welfare payments
were at stake, the New York practice of seven days notice by letter and personal conference
was acceptable to notify the potential recipient that there were questions regarding the recipient's continued eligibility. The Supreme Court suggested that in some cases it would be fairer
to give more time. However, the fatal due process defects occurred when the city denied the

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

timony and production of materials, to move for particularization, and other
35
means by which he can prepare a response and a defense.'
The United States Supreme Court applied the fair notice and hearing
test in the leading case on procedural rights in attorney discipline proceedings, In re Ruffalo. 136 In that case, the respondent was a trial lawyer whose
practice included many Federal Employers' Liability Act 137 cases. Respondent had been charged, originally, among other counts, with using an agent to
solicit FELA plaintiffs as clients. During the hearings, respondent testified,
as did the agent, that the latter did not solicit clients but merely investigated
FELA cases for him. Since some of the cases investigated involved, as
defendant, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the agent's principal employer,
the disciplinary board permitted the pleadings to be amended to include a
count charging that the attorney hired the agent to investigate his own
employer. A motion to strike the new charge was denied but a continuance
8
to prepare a response thereto was granted. 13
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent had been deprived of
fair notice and an opportunity to be heard because the charge, as amended,
was not known before the proceedings began and no new evidence was
taken to determine its validity-all the relevant evidence was adduced prior
to the amendment. 139 The attorney had "had no notice that his employment
of [the agent] would be considered a disbarment offense until after both he
and [the agent] had testified at length on all material facts pertaining to this
phase of the case.'' 140 The Court emphasized that the charges must be made
known before the disciplinary proceedings commence. "They become a
trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of
testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge
the earlier statements and start afresh. ' 1 41 The Court reversed the disbarment decision below on the ground that "[tihis absence of fair notice as to
the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges
1 42
deprived petitioner of procedural due process. "
The need for specificity of the formal charges is related to the opportunity given a respondent to request clarification, particularization and to
obtain discovery. Where courts have made statements as to the necessary
recipients an opportunity to appear personally or by counsel before the official determining
eligibility. Thus, no evidence could be presented nor could witnesses be confronted or crossexamined.
135. Id. at 267-69.

136. 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1967).
137. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-54 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the FELA].
138. See 390 U.S. at 545-47 for the factual background of the Ruffalo case.
139. Id. at 549.
140. Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 551.
142. Id. at 552.
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degree of specificity, they have tended to emphasize the noncriminal nature
of the proceedings and to allow pleadings which give adequate notice even
though they may be inartfully drawn. 143 The states might consider adopting
the rule applied by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in In re Haggerty.144
This approach emphasizes that the factual allegations should be "sufficiently specific to fairly inform the respondent of the charges against him and of
the nature of the facts sought to be proved so as to enable him to prepare his
defense.' ' 45 The Court pointed out that respondent retained the right to
request a supplementary hearing to produce further testimony in rebuttal or
explanation of evidence adduced by the commission or where he might have
been surprised.1 "
As to the length of time to be given a judge to prepare his defense in a
disciplinary proceeding, there is no clear rule established. In McCartney v.
Commission on Judicial Qualifications," the court indicated that three
months was ample. In In re Hanson, 14 the Alaska Supreme Court found
satisfactory written notice to respondent by certified mail, at least fifteen
days prior to the scheduled hearing. The Supreme Court of Texas, in In re
Carrillo 149 viewed notice as adequate where the notice was filed on October 8, 1975, and the pretrial hearing was October 25, 1975, and a hearing on
the merits was November 3, 1975. Each jurisdiction should establish reasonable notice provisions and permit, as appropriate, additional time for
preparation by respondent for the hearing.
Motions for increased specificity are provided for under the Proposed
Standards and are to be presented to the commission. 11 An appeal from the
commission ruling is available. 15 1 Amendment to charges is permitted,
pursuant to the Proposed Standards, so long as a reasonable amount of time
following amendment is allowed for the preparation of the defense and so
long as respondent has not testified with respect to the subject matter of the
52
amendments. 1
Discovery
The Proposed Standards recommend that commission rules provide
that all parties to judicial discipline proceedings be entitled to discovery to
143. See In re McKay, 280 Ala. 174, 191 So. 2d 1 (1966); In re Kunkle, 218 N.W.2d 521
(N.D. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1036 (1974).
144. 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
145. Id. at 19, 241 So. 2d at 475.
146. Id. at 22-23, 241 So. 2d at 476.
147. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 519, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974).
148. 532 P.2d 303, 305 (Alas. 1973).
149. 542 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. 1976).
150. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying No. 5.3.
151. Id. at Nos. 7.1-7.13.

152. Id. at No.5.16; see Farnham v.State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 605,552 P.2d 445, 131 Cal. Rptr.
661 (1976).
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the broadest extent available in the jurisdiction for any kind of judicial
proceeding.' 53 The breadth of discovery recommended exceeds that now
available in most jurisdictions. For example, although the courts that have
spoken on the subject have viewed discovery as a matter of discretion to be
exercised by the commission, 1' the prevailing practice is to require respondent to demonstrate that he has been prejudiced because of a lack of
55 If he is persuasive, the denial of discovery may not be susdiscovery.'
15 6
tained.
The respondent failed to meet the burden in In re Dupont. 157 In that
case, the respondent had been given access to tape recorded conversations
on which charges regarding the possession and sale of stolen guns were
based. Further, although offered an opportunity to do so, the respondent
failed to request an additional hearing to produce evidence in his own
defense. The court was not persuaded that the disciplinary hearing denying
him prehearing discovery had been unfair. 151
The failure to allow discovery of the identity of citizen complainants
59
was not deemed error by the Supreme Court of Michigan in In re Mikesell1
which held that the policy of confidentiality with respect to such information
should govern.160 In Mikesell, where the judge was charged with lack of
judicial temperament, the court approved the commission's limitation to
discovery of items other than depositions, even where the statute authorized
depositions or, alternatively, written interrogatories. 161
The judicial discipline decisions do not seem to be concerned with the
availability of investigative reports. They are probably not generally discoverable, as work product or as a mere "step in the private deliberations of
the fact-finding body" or on analogy to the confidentiality of grand jury
proceedings. 162 Consideration, without disclosure, of such reports by the
commission, if confined to the probable cause stage, should not be objectionable. The drafters of the Proposed Standards believe that judges
threatened with discipline should have the best possible opportunity to
prepare a defense. 163 The breadth of discovery suggested is intended so to
assist the judge.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.7.

158.

Id.

159.
160.
161.
162.

396 Mich. 517, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
Id. at 534, 243 N.W.2d at 94.
Id. at 533-34, 243 N.W.2d at 93-94.
Crooks v. State Bar, 3 Cal. 3d 346, 355, 475 P.2d 872, 878, 90 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606

12 Cal. 3d 512, 520, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1973).
See, e.g., In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1975).
Id.
Id.

(1970).
163. PROPOSED

STANDARDS,

supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying No. 5.7.
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Availability of discovery, as a matter of right, eliminates the need for
motions for discovery and for commission deliberations with respect thereto
There seems to be no policy argument denying broad discovery, although it
is not required constitutionally for due process. 16 Elimination of the need
for motions is expected generally to accelerate the discovery and preparation
for hearing. The public, the judge and the commission are, then, all better
served by the innovation proposed than by the prevailing method.
The Hearing
A judge who is the subject of disciplinary proceedings is entitled to
certain due process protections with respect to the conduct of the formal
hearing. The protections should be sufficient to ensure a fair trial. 165 Among
those are the right to counsel, the right to respond to charges, which includes
the right to produce, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and the right (at
least where there are or may be related criminal proceedings) of respondent
and his witnesses to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. 16 6 The
full panoply of protection afforded defendants in criminal proceedings is not
constitutionally required. 167
The Proposed Standards provide for the scheduling of the hearing
without undue delay and for notification to respondent and counsel of the
date, time and place. 168 The hearing is to be conducted in a formal manner,
70
69
presided over by a judge or attorney. 1 Testimony should be under oath. 1
The rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings in each respective
jurisdiction should apply. The exclusionary rules followed in criminal proceedings do not apply. 171 The burden of proof does not shift to the respondent-judge except that, if the facts justifying disciplinary action are established by clear and convincing evidence, the judge should have the burden
164. Several attorney disciplinary proceeding cases have discussed discovery problems,
but in much narrower contexts. See, e.g., Farnham v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 605, 609, 552 P.2d
445, 447-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1976); In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 229, 358 A.2d 778, 791
(1976); Archer v. State, 548 S.W.2d 71, 74-75 (Tex. 1977).
165. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 305 (Alas. 1975) (quoting K & L Distribs., Inc. v.
Murkowski, 486 P.2d 351, 357 (Alas. 1971)).
166. Id. at 305.
167. Id. But see Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (availability of fifth amendment for
use in non-criminal proceedings is restricted).
168. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.5. See In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513
(Fla. 1977), where the Florida Supreme Court found no prejudice to respondent despite claims
that the disposition of the proceeding was so expeditious that it did not afford the respondent
adequate time to prepare a defense. No disciplinary cases have held that an inordinate delay in
proceedings have caused an unacceptable degree of damage to the mental health of the
respondent. But see United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1976), in which a dismissal
of an indictment was ordered on such grounds.
169. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.10.
170. Id. at No. 5.11.
171. 257 La. at 23, 241 So. 2d at 475.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

to go forward. 172 The hearing is public and may be conducted before any
one of several suggested factfinders. 173 If the factfinder is not the whole
commission, the record, transcripts of the hearings and factfinder's report
should be submitted to the commission for action as if the hearing had, in
174
fact, been before it.
A number of courts have considered attacks on disciplinary proceedings on due process grounds where the commission itself has not heard the
175
evidence. The most noteworthy of these cases is Mildner v. Gulotta
which held that the use of masters or referees was an acceptable technique to
be employed by busy appellate courts when exercising original jurisdiction.
The court found that the same procedure followed in disciplinary proceedings did not offend due process. 17 6 In Mildner, the New York system in
question utilized a factfinder who reported to the court but whose findings
were not deemed determinative. The court could and did hold, contrary to
the report, that misconduct had been proved and discipline was warranted.
The court found no due process problem in such a proceeding where the trier
of fact could neither consider for itself the demeanor of witnesses nor hear
oral argument. 177
The Proposed Standards provide that written objections to the factfinder's report may be submitted on behalf of the respondent. 17 8 The drafters
recommend that the deciding body rely on the transcripts and evidence
presented at the hearing. 179 This is in accordance with the present prevailing
view. 180 The Proposed Standards further provide that amendments to the
allegations in the formal statement of charges should be permitted after
commencement of the hearing only if merely technical and if the judge is
18
given adequate time to prepare a response. 1
There is no clear statement in the case literature with respect to the
applicability of the fourth amendment' 82 to judicial discipline. If there is a
172. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.13.
173. Id. at Commentary accompanying No. 5.9.
174. Id. at No. 5.19.
175. 405 F. Supp. 182, 195 (E. D. N. Y. 1975), afftd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
176. Id. at 195.

177. Id.
178. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.20.
179. Id. at No. 5.21.
180. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); Spruance v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975).
181. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.16.
182. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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criminal offense underlying the disciplinary proceeding, the admissibility of
the fruits of a search will have been subjected there to the usual tests, as to
whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest, 18 3 with an adequately
supported warrant or on another acceptable basis. In the absence of a
criminal proceeding, it would be unlikely that the question of suppression of
products of an illegal search would arise. It is suggested, however, that,
where a possibility of criminal prosecution exists, in the absence of a waiver
by the judge or an agreement not to disclose by the commission, the
admissibility of evidence against a respondent judge should be weighed
according to the constitutional standard. 184
85
This constitutional standard was explained in In re Haggerty1
which
involved a motion to suppress recordings of conversations made by a police
informer, who attended a celebrated "stag" party. The motion was deemed
properly denied (on the basis of a constitutionality test) because the use of an
eavesdropping device is not barred as an unlawful entry in judicial disciplinary proceedings.'8 6 The Louisiana court concluded that exclusionary evidence rules were only designed for proceedings before juries and did not
affect the degree of reliability or relevance of the material. The court found
that a rule had evolved to permit the use of recorded testimony obtained
without a trespass or unlawful entry and that the recordings were admissible
187
to corroborate a witness' testimony.
The Proposed Standards provide that a recommendation for discipline
188
If
must be concurred in by a majority of all members of the commission.
there is a dissent, it must be transmitted with the majority decision and the
record to the court. 189 Provision is also made for the use of alternates to
183. See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 23, 241 So. 2d 469, 475 (1970).
184. See text accompanying notes 122-152 supra.
185. 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970).
186. Id. at 25, 241 So. 2d at 477.
187. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in explaining this exclusionary rule, relied on relevant
United States Supreme Court authority when it concluded that:
the exclusionary rules of evidence, which have been tailored to the peculiar needs of
juries, were designed for guiding admission or exclusion of evidence, not for weighing its reliability. Nor were they designed for quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings. In proceedings such as this, the reliability of evidence should be determined in light of the circumstances of each case, without regard to whether it should
be considered inadmissible (as, for instance, hearsay) before a jury. Under (this
exculsionary rule), the Commission is free to rely upon any evidence, if under the
circumstances the evidence is found reliable, as well as relevant material.
Id. at 26, 241 So. 2d at 477. See In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564, 571 (Mo. 1976), for an
aberrational situation involving a search by the respondent judge. The claim that the search of a
neighbor's house and the removal from the premises of an axe handle and a piece of pipe were
defensible acts under the "exigent circumstances" exception was given no credence by the
court. Since the judge performed these acts as a private person, he could not even arguably
claim justification under that theory or under any species of self-defense or defense of his
family.
188. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 5.23.
189. Id. at No. 5.24.
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ensure the participation in a proceeding of the required number of commis90
sion members. 1
The degree to which procedures of the commission should be set forth
by rule or regulation has not been the subject of extensive litigation. Judicial
review of procedural questions has focused on the presence or absence of
due process elements. 19 ' Even where certain procedures were specified by
local rule, special ones could be utilized as long as they withstood the due
process tests.192
For the guidance of commission members and staff, and to enable
respondents properly to prepare responses and otherwise defend against
charges, each state should adopt rules governing disciplinary proceedings.
The Proposed Standards provide sufficient flexibility to permit some variation among jurisdictions, without violating traditional notions of procedural
193
due process. The requirements of due process are few and simple.
Regularity of procedures will assist all concerned to ensure that the requirements are met. Regularity need not be equated with rigidity, however.
No attempt has been made to set forth a detailed procedure for situations in which it appears necessary for the protection of the public or of the
judge for immediate action to be taken. In such circumstances, the administrative authority of the state's highest court can be invoked. Provision may
be made by rule or by ad hoc order to take the indicated action. It is assumed
that, in the event a temporary suspension or other expedient solution is
deemed immediately necessary, 194 a hearing will follow as soon thereafter
as possible under the circumstances and the judge will be accorded due
process.
The effect of discipline in a foreign jurisdiction has not been considered
by the courts, nor was it discussed by the drafters. Provision for some
reciprocity or comity or full faith and credit as to attorney discipline is
appropriate and has been approved, 195 although not unreservedly, by the
courts. 196

Since one cannot hold a judicial position in more than one state, the
only foreign discipline relevant to a judge would be his conduct as an
attorney. Whether a state's highest court would approve judicial discipline
based on out-of-state attorney misconduct should not be speculated upon
190. Id. at No. 2.5.
191. See text accompanying notes 122-152 supra.
192. See In re Shigon, 462 Pa.I , 329 A.2d 235 (1974).
193. See text accompanying notes 122-152 supra.
194. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Nos. 6.4 and 6.5.
195. Id. at No. 7.12.
196. See In re Weiner, 530 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1975). But see In re Kimball, 40 App. Div. 2d
252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd,on other grounds, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d
453 (1973).
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here. It is likely, however, that the test sought to be applied would be that
relating to the bringing of disrepute upon the office.
197
There is no constitutional requirement, as there is in criminal trials,
that disciplinary hearings be public. Nor does the respondent have a right to
trial by jury. 198 Somewhat aberrationally, however, Texas provides for a
jury trial in attorney discipline but characterizes the proceedings as civil
since they are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 199
In a disciplinary matter involving an attorney who was suspended for two
years for various improprieties involving clients' funds he held in trust, the
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas specifically found that the court could
disregard the jury's answer to a special question because, although the
accused has the right to trial by jury in the county of his residence, the Rules
200
of Civil Procedure, not criminal law, governed.
There seems to be an unspoken requirement for proof of some degree
of scienter which is more analogous to civil tests of liability than1 to criminal
20
culpability. The usual test is clear and convincing evidence.
FINAL DIsPOSITION:

THE ROLE OF THE STATE'S HIGHEST COURT

In most states, the responsibility for the discipline of judges is vested in
the highest court. 202 The Proposed Standards implement such a system and
the drafters recommend that states not now following the prevailing pattern
do so. 20 3 The highest court is, in fact, the court of original jurisdiction in
these matters. The commission may be viewed as discharging the court's
delegated responsibility as to all matters except the actual imposition of
discipline as to which it serves in an advisory capacity.2 4 The commission's
recommendations for discipline are received and acted upon by the court.
The Proposed Standards provide that the high court have complete
discretion in imposing discipline. It may, when it deems appropriate: (1)
remand for further findings or for expansion of the record; 20 5 (2) permit
supplementary filings or presentation of oral argument; 20 6 (3) hold a pending
197. See generally text accompanying notes 122-152 supra.
198. See In re Daly, 284 Minn. 567, 171 N.W.2d 818 (1969); In re Northwestern Bonding
Co., 16 N.C. App. 2d 272, 192 S.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 282 N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 837
(1972); Sharpe v. Oklahoma, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1968).
199. Archer v. State, 548 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tex. 1977).

200. Id.
201. See Todd & Proctor, supra note 5, at 178-83.
202. See Gillis, supra note 6, at 122-28.
203. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at Commentary accompanying Nos. 7.9 and 7.11.

204. Id. at No. 7.11.
205. Id. at Nos. 7.4 and 7.5.
206. Id. at No. 7.6.
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matter to await the outcome of a related proceeding; 20 7 and (4) consider
imposing discipline as an attorney in addition to that as a judge. 208 Where
there are special circumstances the court should be deemed to have the
flexibility to accommodate them. 20 9
The imposition of discipline is subject to review only upon issuance of
a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.21 0 It is a state
interest, that of the integrity of the court system, which is served by judicial
disciplinary proceedings. Barring such considerations as harassment, bad
faith, or constitutional irregularities inherent in the procedures, the federal
courts will refrain from intervention either at an intermediate stage, by way
of injunction, or upon final disposition. Due process challenges are not
foreclosed. 211
The only recommended exception to the exercise of disciplinary power
by the state's highest court is where the judge charged is a member of that
body. The drafters suggest that each state provide by rule for an alternate
body, composed of the same number of members as the court, to sit in such
matters.

2 12

The Proposed Standards provide for discipline as an attorney in connection with disciplinary proceedings against a judge. 213 "[A] judge is
required to conduct himself under standards which are much higher than
those required of an attorney.' '214 Therefore, where misconduct so requires,
sanctions both as judge and as attorney should be imposed by the state's
highest court and should be based on a single disciplinary proceeding. 215 An
additional consideration is the possibility that factual findings in a prior
attorney disciplinary proceeding might be viewed as binding upon the
judicial disciplinary factfinder where the charges arose from the same
conduct. It is conceivable that an estoppel argument could be made based on
207. Id. at No. 7.4.
208. Id. at No. 7.12.
209. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 310-11 (Alas. 1975); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 682,
304 A.2d 587, 599 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
210. See MacKay v. Nesbette, 285 F. Supp.498,503 (D.Alas. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1004 (1969). See also Gipson v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 416 F. Supp. 1126 (D.N.J. 1976), for a
discussion of non-interference.
211. See cases cited in note 209 supra.
212. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 7.13.
213. Id. at No.7.12.
214. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (La. 1977).
215. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, at No. 7.12. The drafters would not recommend
permitting the judge the "right" to choose by what disciplinary body his conduct is to be
reviewed, or even, by which of two it would first be reviewed. The impact of disciplinary
proceedings on the judicial systems is such that allowing the indignity of proceeding against a
judge first as an attorney, by attorneys is most inappropriate. His presence on the bench during
such proceedings would embarrass the system. A judge is initially answerable to the public and
to the courts for conduct which might affect his ability to continue to serve in that capacity. See
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n. v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).
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the dismissal of charges heard in the context of an attorney disciplinary
proceeding.
CONCLUSION

The procedures discussed above and those expressed as standards by
the drafters of the Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline or Disability are
intended to ensure that due process requirements are incorporated in the
operation of state judicial disciplinary systems. The purposes of these
systems have been described in terms of the needs of the public, the court
system and the judges proceeded against.
Each system must have public credibility. Provision for public adjudicatory hearings and for final action by the state's highest court should
make it apparent to the public that the system can work, that tax expenditures to maintain it are justified, and that the judiciary takes the conduct
standards seriously and is willing to enforce them.
The systems must demonstrate that they operate fairly and with due
concern for the reputation of each respondent judge. The confidentiality
required of proceedings, except for those reaching the adjudicatory stage,
the provision for prompt dispelling of unsupported allegations, the broad
opportunity for respondent to have discovery, and, where possible, the
professional experienced staff to sift out the chaff at a preliminary stage
should merit the trust of all judges.
In the light of increased judicial discipline experience and the development of decisional law in the area, these procedures should permit
reasonable accommodation among competing considerations. The fact that
the high court is the ultimate decision-maker in each state enables the judges
to take cognizance of special problems of judicial service of which the
public cannot be aware. The opportunity to present evidence in mitigation
where discipline may be deemed appropriate also permits judicial weighing
and balancing. Where masters or small hearing panels are used, the commission's initial review and the court's ultimate review ensure uniformity on a
statewide basis.
The promulgation of rules in accordance with the Proposed Standards
will permit commissions and respondents to plan their cases. Predictability,
with respect to the standards of conduct required and the method by which
they are enforced, will ultimately reassure the public that the judicial branch
is meeting its responsibilities in the disciplinary area.

